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APPELLATE PROCEDURE: AMENDMENTS




Both the Oklahoma Statutes governing appellate procedure and
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure are undergoing substantial
revision this year. In the Oklahoma state courts, the date of finality of
a judgment, which determines its enforceability and the timing of ap-
peals and post-trial motions, is being shifted from the date of the
court's pronouncement of the decision to the date of filing of the judg-
ment with the court clerk. This fundamental change brings Oklahoma
appellate procedure into greater conformity with the federal courts
and other jurisdictions. In the federal courts, various amendments are
being made to reduce litigation over the naming of the parties to an
appeal, clarify the timing of appeals, and remove a procedural trap
that has caused the dismissal of numerous appeals. Interestingly, a
number of the amendments to the Oklahoma Statutes parallel the
amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
This article examines the revisions to Oklahoma and federal ap-
pellate procedure that are going into effect this year. It begins with
the recent history of appellate reform in Oklahoma, analyzes the
newly enacted Judgments and Appeals Act, and then reviews a
number of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
* Professor of Law, The University of Tulsa College of Law. Professor Adams has been a
member of the Civil Procedure Committee of the Oklahoma Bar Association for a number of
years and served as its Chairman during 1987-1989. The Civil Procedure Committee drafted the
original Judgments and Appeals Act that was adopted and repealed in 1991. He also partici-
pated in the drafting of the new Judgments and Appeals Act.
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II. OKLAHOMA APPELLATE PROCEDURE:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Before 1991, title 12, section 990 of the Oklahoma Statutes set a
deadline of 30 days "from the date of the final order or judgment
sought to be reviewed" for the filing of a petition in error with the
Supreme Court. The date of a final order or judgment was construed
to be the time of its pronouncement by the judge.' In a number of
cases, it was difficult to ascertain whether a statement by a judge was a
pronouncement of judgment, particularly where the judge's pro-
nouncement was accompanied by a direction for the prevailing party's
attorney to prepare a journal entry of judgment.' Moreover, in the
absence of a written memorialization of the judgment, there could be
uncertainty as to its precise terms.
To promote greater clarity concerning the finality of judgments in
Oklahoma state courts, the Oklahoma Bar Association approved a
comprehensive legislative program3 that eventually became known as
the Judgments and Appeals Act.' The Judgments and Appeals Act
repealed many of the prior statutes concerning appellate procedure
and replaced them with sections 1001-1008 of title 12 of the Oklahoma
Statutes. The Act provided that for the purpose of an appeal the date
of a judgment was the date of its filing with the court clerk, rather
than the date of its pronouncement. 5 Upon the filing of the judgment
the court clerk was required to send a file-stamped copy to all parties,
unless the judgment was signed in the presence of all parties.6 This
1. See Depuy v. Hoeme, 775 P.2d 1339, 1343 (Okla. 1989) ("A judgment or order is ren-
dered and begins its legal life as soon as it is pronounced from the bench and before it is ever
reduced to writing for entry of record by the clerk."); Miller v. Miller, 664 P.2d 1032, 1034 (Okla.
1983) ("A judgment is rendered and exists as such when it is pronounced from the bench and
before it has been reduced to writing and entered by the clerk."); Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v.
McBroom, 526 P.2d 509,511 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974) ("Judgment is rendered when pronounced by
the Court and the Journal Entry is only a record thereof.") (Approved for Publication by
Supreme Court).
2. E. Dwight Morgan, Delayed Attacks on Final Judgments, 33 OKLA. L. REv. 45, 45 n.1
(1980) ("A judgment is rendered whenever the judge indicates a present intention to adjudicate
the matter. Since no particular form is required there is sometimes uncertainty as to exactly
when a judgment is pronounced."). See Shaw v. Sturgeon, 304 P.2d 341, 343 (Okla. 1956) (hold-
ing that court's statement directing parties to prepare journal entry was not sufficiently explicit
to qualify as a judgment); News-Dispatch Printing & Audit Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 270 P. 2,3
(Okla. 1928) (ruling that a minute entry reflecting that the court rendered judgment for the
defendants "as per journal entry to be filed" did not constitute a judgment).
3. See Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, 59 OKLA. B.J. 2724, 2729 (1988).
4. See Harvey D. Ellis, Jr., The 1991 Repeal of the 1990 Judgments and Appeals Act, 62
OKLA. B.J. 2793 (1991).
5. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004(A) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991).
6. Id § 1002(B).
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assured that the parties would have notice of the date of filing, which
was significant because the deadlines for filing post-trial motions and
for commencing an appeal were generally measured from the date of
filing of the judgment under the Act.7
The filing requirement introduced some delay in a judgment's fi-
nality because of the additional time it required for preparation, sub-
mission to the judge, and filing. It also created an opportunity for
mischief, since a losing party could postpone a judgment's enforce-
ment and the deadline for filing an appeal or post-trial motions by
stalling approval of the proposed judgment. The Judgments and Ap-
peals Act sought to minimize such stalling tactics by setting out a
timetable for attorneys to prepare proposed judgments and submit
them to the judge, and for the judge to rule on written objections to
proposed judgments. It also provided for simplified judgment forms
and urged trial judges to prepare and sign their own judgments after a
general verdict or when the relief awarded was a sum certain.,
Although parts of the Judgments and Appeals Act were modelled
on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it departed substantially
from the Federal Rules in the procedure it specified for the prepara-
tion of judgments. Federal Rule 58 states that generally attorneys will
not participate in the drafting of judgments. While this may be feasi-
ble in federal courts, it is not in Oklahoma state courts. The
Oklahoma state courts have more severe limitations on clerical sup-
port than do the federal courts, and in addition, particularly long and
complex judgments are necessary for many of the cases (such as di-
vorce and foreclosure proceedings) that are tried primarily in state
courts. Thus, practical considerations necessitated assigning responsi-
bility for preparing judgments to attorneys in at least some of the
cases in Oklahoma state courts.
The Judgments and Appeals Act also included a variety of other
procedural reforms. Although the Oklahoma Statutes authorized
courts to award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party, they did
not specify when a prevailing party should seek such an award.9 In
addition, Oklahoma law was ambiguous as to whether a judgment
7. See OKI.A. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991), §§ 653 (new trial motions),
698 (motions for j.n.o.v.), 1031.1 (motions to vacate) (Supp. 1990) (amended 1991, 1993). How-
ever, the deadline for commencing an appeal from an appealable interlocutory order was mea-
sured from the date of the hearing at which the order was issued. For further discussion see text
at notes 87-89, infra.
8. Id. § 1001(C),(D),(E).
9. G.A. Mosites Co. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 545 P.2d 746,752-53 (Okla. 1976) ("No
statute or court rule set the time for filing of the motion to tax costs or attorney's fees and no
1993]
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could be final and appealable if the trial court had not issued a ruling
on an application for attorney fees.10 The Judgments and Appeals Act
prescribed a 30-day deadline from the filing of the judgment for a
party to apply for attorney's fees, costs, or interest," and it also stated
that a judgment's finality would not be prevented on account of the
pendency of an application for attorney's fees, costs, or interest.1 2
Other procedural reforms enacted in the Judgments and Appeals Act
were 1) a provision allowing petitions in error to be filed by certified
mail with filing effective on the date of mailing, 2) a bright line rule
that post-trial motions filed within ten days of the filing of the judg-
ment extended the time to appeal until they were decided, while post-
trial motions filed later did not, 3) savings provisions for prematurely
filed appeals, 4) a provision based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) for appeals
in cases involving multiple claims and parties that postponed the time
for appeal until all claims were resolved, unless the trial court ordered
otherwise, 5) consolidation of the statutes governing stays of judg-
ments and codification of the automatic ten-day stay for money judg-
ments, and 6) authorization for Oklahoma appellate courts to impose
sanctions for frivolous appeals.
Shortly after the Judgments and Appeals Act took effect in Janu-
ary, 1991, a number of Oklahoma judges, attorneys, and court clerks
began protesting its effects. Most of the complaints were directed at
the judgment forms that the Act prescribed for the preparation of
judgments. The judgment forms were almost identical to those in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but attorneys whose practices em-
phasized mortgage foreclosures and probate matters were upset be-
cause the judgment forms were not suited to those types of cases.
The objections to the Judgments and Appeals Act could have
been resolved by amending the provisions concerning the judgment
forms and the procedures for the preparation of judgments. Instead
the Oklahoma Legislature overreacted by repealing nearly all of the
Judgments and Appeals Act and re-enacting the statutes that the Act
had repealed. In doing so, the Legislature condemned a number of
innocent statutory reforms along with the guilty judgment forms. The
authority is cited to us as to the necessity to pray for attorney fees before judgment or the right
to award them afterwards.").
10. Cindy Jo Percival, Note, Procedure: Effect of Attorneys Fees on Finality of Judg-
ment"Amendment to Rule 1.11(c), 40 OL.A. L. Rthv. 145 (1987) (referring to this issue as "a
serious question on the the most fundamental level of appellate procedure.").
11. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1003 (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991).
12. Id. § 1001(B).
[Vol. 29:31
4
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/2
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
innocent statutory reforms that the Legislature repealed included 1)
provisions governing the award of costs, attorney fees, and interest, 2)
provisions regarding the timing of post-trial motions, 3) savings provi-
sions for premature appeals, 4) the automatic ten-day stay for money
judgments, and 5) authorization for appellate courts to impose sanc-
tions. However, the Legislature spared three key provisions from the
original Judgments and Appeals Act. These were:
1. Section 990A" Specifying the 30-day period for filing a petition
in error runs "from the date the final order or judgment is
filed."
2. Section 990A " Allowing the petition in error to be fied by cer-
tified mail, and providing that the date of mailing constitutes
the date of filing.
3. Section 1006 " Postponing the filing of appeals in cases involv-
ing multiple claims or parties until all claims are decided, unless
the trial court expressly directs the preparation and filing of ajudgment before all claims are decided.
The change in Section 990A concerning the timing of appeals
partly preserved the primary purpose of the Judgments and Appeals
Act, but a number of revisions in other statutes were needed to fully
implement this change. The failure to make the necessary revisions to
other statutes has led to some disagreeable results in cases decided in
the past couple of years.' 3
The Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases14 were another
source of problems. At the same time that the Oklahoma Legislature
adopted the Judgments and Appeals Act, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court made extensive amendments to its Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure in Civil Cases to conform to the changes made by the Judgments
and Appeals Act. The Supreme Court did not revise the Rules after
the Act's repeal, however. As a result, the Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure now contain a number of references to statutes that have been
repealed, and in general, the Oklahoma Statutes and the Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure are out of synch with one other. The Oklahoma
13. See Jaco Production Co. v. Luca, 823 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1991) (holding that an appeal must
be commenced within 30 days of the filing of the verdict in a common law action); Rodgers v.
Higgins, 64 Okla. BJ. 1255 (Apr. 14, 1993) (following Jaco). See also Estate of Heimbach, 827
P.2d 170 (Okla. 1992) (ruling that a motion to modify filed within 10 days of the filing of ajudgment, but more than 10 days after its pronouncement, did not extend the time to appeal).
14. The Rules of Appellate Procedure in Civil Cases are codified at OaA. STAT. tit. 12, ch.
15, app. 1 (1991).
1993]
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Supreme Court had good reason for not amending the Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure, because it was aware that the Legislature had es-
tablished an Interim Advisory Committee on Judgments and Post-
Judgment Procedure to draft legislation to streamline and clarify the
procedures for the rendition of judgments and the filing of appeals in
civil cases.'- Instead of issuing a new set of Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure for the interim period until the new legislation was enacted, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court decided to wait until the Legislature com-
pleted its reform of appellate procedure before modifying its Rules
again. Unfortunately, it has taken two legislative sessions for the latest
Judgments and Appeals Act to work its way through the Oklahoma
Legislature, but now that it has, the Oklahoma Supreme Court should
finally be ready to bring the Rules of Appellate Procedure into line
with the Oklahoma Statutes.
The next section of this article examines the latest Judgments and
Appeals Act.
III. THE 1993 JUDGMENTS AND APPEALS Acr
A. Timing of Appeals-In General
Although the Legislature repealed most of the original Judg-
ments and Appeals Act in 1991, it retained the following provision in
section 990A(A): "An appeal to the Supreme Court may be com-
menced by filing a petition in error with the Clerk of the Supreme
Court within thirty (30) days from the date the final order or judg-
ment is filed."'1 6 In P & H Oil Field Serv., Inc. v. Spectra Energy
Corp.,'7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that this provision re-
quired an appeal to be filed after the filing of the final order or judg-
ment sought to be reviewed. Thus, it ruled that an appeal commenced
after the judge's pronouncement of an order overruling a motion for
new trial was premature because the petition in error was filed before
the filing of the order.'8 To avoid unfairness and unnecessary hard-
ship to the appellant who was evidently unaware of section 990(A)'s
change in the timing of appeals, however, the Supreme Court gave its
ruling only prospective effect.
15. S. Con. Res. 20, 1991 Okla. Sess. Laws 3246.
16. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 990A (1991) (amended 1993).
17. 823 P.2d 365 (Okla. 1991).
18. See also Patmon v. Block, 851 P.2d 539,541,543 (Okla. 1993) (filing of appeal on May 6
from dismissal order filed on April 7 was timely).
[Vol. 29:31
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/2
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
Despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court's reliance on section 990A
in the P & H case, the Court appeared to disregard the change in the
time limit for filing an appeal in Jaco Production Co. v. Luca.19 In the
Jaco case, the Court held that a petition in error filed within 30 days of
the filing of the journal entry of judgment signed by the judge was
untimely, because the time to appeal ran from the filing of the jury
verdict, rather than from the filing of the journal entry of judgment.
The Jaco holding was based on title 12, section 696.1 of the Oklahoma
Statutes, which provided: "When a trial by jury has been had, judg-
ment must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, unless
it is special, or the court orders the case to be reserved for future
argument or consideration. '20 This statute's predecessor 2' had been
repealed by the original Judgments and Appeals Act, and then reen-
acted when the Judgments and Appeals Act was repealed. Section
696.1 was inconsistent with section 990A's provision regarding the
timing of appeals, and it should not have been reenacted when the
Judgments and Appeals Act was repealed. Unfortunately, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court relied on its reenactment to undercut the
reform intended by the timing provision in section 990A. Once again,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court gave its decision only prospective ef-
fect to avoid unnecessary hardship to the appellants.
Jaco was distinguished in McGinnis v. Republic-Underwriters In-
surance Co.,2 a case arising out of a special statutory postjudgment
garnishment proceeding. The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded
that Jaco's application was restricted to common law actions. Then
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Jaco in Rodgers v. Higgins,' in which it
dismissed an appeal that was filed within 30 days after the filing of the
journal entry on the ground that it was untimely because the petition
in error was filed more than 30 days after the jury verdict. Rodgers
was a close decision - only four Justices concurred with the majority
opinion, four Justices dissented, and one concurred by reason of stare
decisis.
The latest Judgments and Appeals Act supersedes the Jaco line of
cases by repealing section 696.124 and providing in section 696.2(C):
"The following shall not constitute a judgment, decree or appealable
19. 823 P.2d 364 (Okla. 1991).
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 696.1 (1991) (repealed 1993).
21. Id. § 696 (1981) (repealed 1990).
22. 830 P.2d 191 (1992).
23. 64 OmA. BI. 1255 (Apr. 14, 1993).
24. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 29.
1993]
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order: A minute entry; verdict, informal statement of the proceedings
and relief awarded, including, but not limited to, a letter to a party or
parties indicating the ruling or instructions for preparing the judg-
ment, decree or appealable order."5 In order for the 30-day period
for filing a petition in error to begin to run, section 990A 26 requires a
judgment, decree, or appealable order containing 1) a caption with the
name of the court, the names of the parties, the file number of the
case, and the title of the instrument, 2) a statement of the disposition
of the action, and 3) the signature and title of the court to be filed with
the court clerk.'
Section 990A also provides that if a matter was taken under ad-
visement the 30 days to file a petition in error does not begin to run
until a file-stamped copy of the judgment, decree, or appealable order
is mailed to the appealing party. This provision was designed to in-
sure that an appellant will not lose the opportunity to appeal on ac-
count of not being given notice that the judgment was filed in a case
taken under advisement. If a file-stamped copy of the judgment is not
mailed to the appealing party, the judgment's finality would remain
suspended indefinitely. In contrast, no notice of the filing of a judg-
ment is required if the judgment is issued at a hearing.
The distinction between decisions taken under advisement and
decisions announced at a hearing differs from federal appellate proce-
dure and was the result of a compromise reached with the Oklahoma
court clerks before the passage of the original Judgments and Appeals
Act. An early version of the original Judgments and Appeals Act in-
cluded a provision based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 77(d) that required court
clerks to mail notices of entry of judgments to all parties as soon as
they were entered in their judgment dockets.29 The court clerks in
Oklahoma objected to this provision because of the burden that hav-
ing to mail a notice of entry of judgment for every case would cause
them. The court clerks recognized, however, that mailing was neces-
sary in a case where a judge took a matter under advisement and is-
sued a decision out of the presence of the parties.30 They therefore
25. Id § 9 (emphasis added).
26. Id § 18.
27. Id, § 10.
28. Id. § 18.
29. See Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code, supra note 4 at 2729.
30. See McCuUough v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 626 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Okla. 1981) (ruling that
judgment was not "rendered" in a case taken under advisement until notice of its entry was
mailed to the parties).
[Vol. 29:31
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agreed to support the original Judgments and Appeals Act if the
mandatory mailing was restricted to cases taken under advisement.
The lack of a provision for notice of the filing of the judgment in
cases that are not taken under advisement has the potential for caus-
ing problems for attorneys who may not be aware of when the 30 days
to file a petition in error starts to run. In most cases, however, the
filing will occur soon after either the hearing at which the decision was
pronounced or after the attorneys have approved the form of the
judgment, and an attorney can readily ascertain the exact date of filing
by checking with the court clerk. As a practical matter, therefore, at-
torneys will have adequate notice of approximately when the judg-
ment is filed. In cases where the filing occurs more than a week after
the decision was pronounced or an attorney approved the form of the
judgment, the attorney should mail a file-stamped copy of the judg-
ment to opposing counsel in order to avoid a potential due process
problem.31 In addition, the trial court may direct the attorney filing
the judgment to mail copies to opposing counsel.
While most judgments are not effective until they are filed with
the court clerk under the latest Judgments and Appeals Act, judg-
ments in some cases are effective as soon as they are pronounced, just
as they were under prior Oklahoma law. Section 696.2(D) provides
that judgments in the following assortment of actions are effective as
soon as they are pronounced by the court: divorce; separate mainte-
nance; annulment; post-decree matrimonial proceedings; paternity;
custody; adoption; termination of parental rights; mental health;
guardianship; juvenile matters; habeas corpus proceedings; and pro-
ceedings for temporary restraining orders, temporary injunctions, per-
manent injunctions, conservatorship, probate proceedings, special
executions in foreclosure actions, quiet title actions, partition proceed-
ings and contempt citations.32 Judgments in these categories of cases
were made immediately effective for various reasons. In domestic re-
lations cases, there is a possibility that one of the spouses might die or
want to remarry between the time of the pronouncement of a divorce
and the filing of a divorce decree, and some parents might be tempted
to defy child custody orders if they were not enforceable promptly
after being pronounced. The rule in Arkansas, for example, that a
31. Cf CAJ. CODE CIV. Pioc § 664.5 (West 1987) ("[T]he party submitting an order or
judgment for entry shall prepare and mail a copy of the notice of entry of judgment to all parties
who have appeared in the action or proceeding and shall file with the court the original notice of
entry of judgment together with the proof of service by mail.").
32. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 9.
1993]
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judgment is not effective until it is entered in the appropriate docket
has led to unhappy consequences in several divorce cases.33
Section 696.2(D) provides that even though a judgment in one of
these types of actions is immediately effective, the appeal time does
not start until the judgment is filed with the court clerk. 4 Under prior
Oklahoma law, the effectiveness and the appealability of a judgment
were both tied to the date of its rendition; however, the effectiveness
and appealability of judgments are not always linked under the
Oklahoma Judgments and Appeals Act.35 Thus, in certain types of ac-
tions, there will be a gap between the time a judgment becomes effec-
tive and the time it becomes reviewable on appeal. For most cases,
the preparation and filing of a judgment or decree will take no longer
than a few weeks, and therefore, this gap should generally be fairly
short. In addition, if circumstances warrant, the trial court may grant
a stay of enforcement of the judgment under sections 990.3(C) and
990.4(C)36 in order to eliminate any problems that the gap might
cause in a particular case. Alternatively, a party may seek relief
through an extraordinary writ before the judgment becomes
appealable.37
B. Timing of Post-Trial Motions
An alternative means besides appeal for attempting to overturn a
judgment is to seek relief from the trial court through a post-trial mo-
tion, such as a motion for new trial,38 a motion for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict (judgment n.o.v.),39 or a motion to vacate the
judgment.4 Before 1991, the time limits for filing these post-trial mo-
tions were all based on the rendition of the judgment. The original
Judgments and Appeals Act amended the various statutes governing
33. See Standbridge v. Standbridge, 769 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Ark. 1989) (holding that second
marriage was void, because it was performed before the divorce decree of one of the spouses was
filed, even though the divorce proceedings were heard two days before the marriage ceremony);
Childress v. McManus, 668 S.W.2d 9 (Ark. 1984) (ruling that divorce decree filed after spouse's
death was invalid even though divorce was orally granted two weeks before the spouse died);
Cook v. Lobianco, 648 S.W.2d 808 (Ark. 1983) (holding that divorce action abated upon death of
spouse, even though divorce was granted before spouse died).
34. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 9.
35. Cf. TEXAs RUiES OF CIVIL PRA CcE AND REMEDIES, Rule 306a (in Texas, judgments
and orders are effective upon rendition, but the periods for the filing of post-trial motions and
appeals do not start to run until the judgment is signed).
36. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, §§ 20, 21.
37. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 1451-1462 (1991).
38. Id. § 653 (1991) (amended 1993).
39. Id. § 698.
40. Id. §§ 1031, 1031.1.
[Vol. 29:31
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post-trial motions to make the time for filing these motions parallel
the timing of appeals by having all the deadlines run from the filing of
the judgment with the court clerk, rather than its rendition. When the
original Judgments and Appeals Act was repealed, the Legislature re-
stored the statutes governing post-trial motions to their pre-1991
forms so that the times for filing the post-trial motions ran from their
rendition, rather than from their filing with the court clerk. The provi-
sion in section 990A setting the deadline for filing a petition in error at
30 days after the filing of the judgment applied only to appeals. As a
result, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in Estate of Heimbach,41
that a motion to modify that was filed within ten days of the filing of
the judgment, but more than ten days after its pronouncement, was
not a timely post-judgment motion that would extend the time for ap-
peal. However, as in the P & H and Jaco cases, the Court found that
the enactment and repeal of the Judgments and Appeals Act and the
absence of published case law on point had created a procedural trap,
and therefore, it decided to give its ruling only prospective effect.
The latest Judgments and Appeals Act brings the times for filing
post-trial motions back into line with the deadline for filing an appeal.
Sections 653, 698, 1031.1, and 1038 of title 12 of the Oklahoma Stat-
utes have all been amended so that effective October 1, 1993, the time
limits are based on the filing of the judgment with the court clerk.42
Under sections 653 and 698, as amended, motions for new trial and for
judgment n.o.v. must be filed within ten days after the judgment is
filed with the court clerk.43 If the judgment has been taken under
advisement, the ten days runs from the date of mailing of a file-
stamped copy of the judgment to the moving party, rather than from
its filing.' The amended version of section 1031.1 allows 30 days after
the filing of a judgment for the filing of a motion to correct, open, or
modify the judgment under its provisions.45 Similarly, the one-, two-,
and three-year periods in section 1038 for proceedings to vacate or
modify a judgment are now measured from the time of filing of the
judgment with the court clerk, rather than from its rendition.46
41. 827 P.2d 170 (Okla. 1992).
42. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, §§ 8, 12, 25, 27.
43. Id. §§ 8, 12.
44. Id.
45. Id § 25.
46. Id. § 27.
1993]
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Section 1031.1 has also been amended to clarify the timing of mo-
tions to correct, open, or modify judgments under its provisions.47
Although the prior statutory language was not clear on the point,
Oklahoma appellate courts had allowed trial courts to vacate or mod-
ify a judgment under section 1031.1 more than 30 days after the rendi-
tion of the judgment in response to a motion filed less than 30 days
after rendition.' The amended language of Section 1031.1 makes
clear that the trial court has this term-time authority.
One potential problem with the specification of deadlines in sec-
tions 653, 698, and 1031.1 for filing post-trial motions is that it creates
the possibility that some motions will be premature if they are filed
after the judgment is pronounced, but before it is filed. The statutes
all require the motions to be filed within ten (or 30) days after the
judgment has been filed with the court clerk.49 This pitfall could be
eliminated by adding a sentence to the various statutes that a motion
filed before the filing of the judgment but after its pronouncement
would still be effective.
C. Filing of Appeals by Certified Mail
Another of the changes made by the original Judgments and Ap-
peals Act that the Oklahoma Legislature retained after its repeal was
the authorization in section 990A for filing petitions in error by certi-
fied mail with return receipt requested. Under prior Oklahoma law, a
petition in error needed to be received by the Clerk of the Supreme
Court within the 30-day period for filing in order to be timely.50 Thus,
an appellant who mailed a petition in error to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court took the risk of late delivery by the post office, which would
cause the appeal to be dismissed as untimely. Attorneys for appel-
lants who wished to file petitions in error toward the end of the appeal
period and who wanted to avoid exposure for malpractice had to incur
the expense of utilizing means other than the mail for delivering peti-
tions in error to the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
47. Id. § 25.
48. See, e.g., Schepp v. Hess, 770 P.2d 34, 38 (Okla. 1989) ("Once timely invoked, the trial
court's term-time power may be exercised after the thirty-day period."); Colquitt v. Hill, 680
P.2d 994, 995 (Okla. Ct. App. 1984).
49. In contrast, FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c)(2) & 59(b) provide for the filing of motions for judg-
ment as a matter of law and for new trial "not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment."
(emphasis added).
50. See Turrell v. Continental Oil Co., 466 P.2d 643, 644 (Okla. 1970) (holding that petition
in error mailed from Tulsa on the Friday before the filing deadline on Monday was untimely
because it was not delivered to the Supreme Court until Tuesday).
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Section 990A changed the rule from previous Oklahoma law by
providing that the date of mailing a petition in error is deemed to be
the date of its filing with the Oklahoma Supreme Court, so that an
appeal is timely as long as the petition in error is mailed within 30
days from the filing of the judgment with the court clerk.5 1 Section
990A also provides that the date of mailing is to be established from
the postmark or other proof from the post office. In the absence of
proof from the post office of the date of mailing, the date of filing will
be the date the petition in error is received by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court.5 An appellant who does not want to have to rely on the
Oklahoma Supreme Court's making a record of the date of the post-
mark or its preserving the envelope in which the petition in error is
mailed should obtain a sender's receipt from a postal employee show-
ing the date of mailing. 3
It is important to note that a postmark or some other record from
the post office is necessary to establish the date of mailing under Sec-
tion 990A; the record from a private postal meter will not suffice. In
addition, the envelope containing the petition in error must be prop-
erly addressed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court,54 and the envelope
must bear sufficient postage for delivery. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court has made an exception to section 990A's requirements for pro
se prisoners, however. Following the United States Supreme Court
case of Houston v. Lack,56 the Oklahoma Supreme Court held in
Woody v. State ex rel. Department of Corrections,57 that a pro se pris-
oner's petition in error is deemed to be filed when it is placed in the
prison mailbox or otherwise delivered to the prison authorities for for-
warding to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.
It should be noted that the mailing provision applies only to the
filing of petitions in error, and it does not apply to the filing of other
51. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 18.
52. Id.
53. See United States Postal Service, DomEs-mc MAIL MANUAL § 912.44(d) (1992) (sender
of certified mail may obtain a receipt from the post office showing the time an article is accepted
for mailing).
54. Woods v. Woods, 830 P.2d 1372, 1373 (Okla. 1992) (dismissing an appeal because peti-
tion in error that was addressed to the Court of Appeals was forwarded to and received by the
Supreme Court one day after the 30-day deadline).
55. Eagle Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Rush, 832 P.2d 1224 (Okla. 1992) (dismissing as untimely an
appeal where petition in error mailed on the 30th day after filing of the final order was returned
to the appellant's attorney for insufficient postage and not delivered to the Supreme Court until
several days later).
56. 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
57. 833 P.2d 257, 259 (Okla. 1992).
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papers with the Supreme Court. Rule 1.15(c) of the Rules of Appel-
late Procedure provides: "All briefs, pleadings, motions, petitions for
rehearing, and petitions for certiorari to the Court of Appeals are
deemed filed on date of receipt of the Clerk of the Supreme Court."58
In addition, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that the mailing
provision is not applicable to a proceeding for review of an order by a
three-judge panel of the Workers' Compensation Court.5 9
D. Appeals from Appealable Orders
Besides covering appeals from judgments and decrees, section
990A also governs the filing of petitions in error to review appealable
orders. There are two categories of appealable orders: final orders
and appealable interlocutory orders.
A final order is defined in section 953 of title 12 as one "affecting
a substantial right in an action, when such order, in effect, determines
the action and prevents a judgment, and an order affecting a substan-
tial right, made in a special proceeding or upon a summary application
in an action after judgment."60 Rule 1.10(a) of the Rules of Appellate
Procedure lists the following as examples of final orders: orders deny-
ing motions for new trial, orders granting or denying motions for judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict, orders denying leave to intervene,61
and orders modifying or refusing to vacate or modify final judg-
ments.62 Other examples of final orders include orders granting sum-
mary judgment motions,63 and orders granting motions to dismiss,
whether for failure to state a claim,64 insufficiency of service of
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.15(c) (1991).
59. Ireton v. Saint Francis Hosp., 844 P.2d 151, 151 (Okla. 1992). See also OKLA. STAT. tit.
12, § 696.2(E) ("The preparation of orders, decisions and awards and the taking of appeals in
workers' compensation cases shall be governed by the provisions of Title 85 of the Oklahoma
Statutes.").
60. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 953 (1991).
61. Gettler v. Cities Serv. Co., 739 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1987) ("Denial of a petition for
mandatory intervention by the trial court is an appealable final order."); Stubblefield v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 619 P.2d 620, 624 n.11 (Okla. 1980) ("An order that denies leave to
intervene is appealable.").
62. See Avery v. Jayhawker Gasoline Co., 225 P. 544,547 (Okla. 1924) (ruling that an order
denying motion to set aside an order of dismissal was appealable as a final order); Vann v. Union
Central Life Ins. Co., 191 P. 175,176-77 (Okla. 1920) (holding that an order overruling a motion
to vacate is a final order, but an order vacating a judgment is not, unless it is on the ground that
the judgment is void on its face).
63. Carr v. Braswell, 772 P.2d 915, 917 (Okla. 1989).
64. See Thompson v. Thompson, 86 P.2d 286, 287 (Okla. 1939) (ruling that an order sus-
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process, 65 or on forum non conveniens grounds.6 6 Also, orders ap-
proving the summary report of a receiver6 , and a post-judgment or-
der vacating the appointment of a receiver are final orders.6 An
order that either grants or denies an application for costs, attorney's
fees, or interest under section 696.4(B) 69 would also appear to be a
final order.7" However, an order of dismissal for failure to state a
claim would not be a final order if the plaintiff were permitted to
amend the petition.71 The characteristic that the final orders listed
above have in common is that, unless the order is set aside, either by
the trial court or on appeal, it will conclude the litigation for the party
affected by the order.
Appealable interlocutory orders are orders for which a statute
authorizes an immediate appeal before judgment. The following stat-
utes authorized appeals from various interlocutory orders:7' sections
952 (b)(2), (b)(3) and 993 of title 12; section 817 of title 15 (appeals
arising from arbitration proceedings); 73 and section 721 of title 58 (ap-
peals in probate cases).74 The interlocutory orders from which imme-
diate appeals are authorized by these statutes include orders granting
new trials75 or vacating judgments;76 orders that discharge, vacate, or
65. See Armstrong v. Trustees of Hamilton Inv. Trust, 667 P.2d 985, 987 (Okla. 1983) (hold-
ing that an order granting a plea to jurisdiction and a motion to quash was an appealable final
order).
66. St. Louis-S.F. R.R. v. Superior Court, 290 P.2d 118, 120 (Okla. 1955) (dictum).
67. Kawfield Oil Co. v. Illinois Refining Co., 35 P.2d 961, 963 (Okla. 1934).
68. Exchange Trust Co. v. Oklahoma State Bank, 259 P. 589, 594 (Okla. 1927).
69. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 11.
70. But cf. Timmons Oil Co., Inc. v. Norman, 794 P.2d 400, 401 (Okla. 1990) (ruling that a
motion for new trial on a reserved attorney fee issue extended time for appeal) (decided before
the adotion of § 696.4).
71. See Frazier v. Bryan Memorial Hosp. Auth., 775 P.2d 281, 285-86 (Okla. 1989) (ruling
that an order of dismissal for failure to state a claim was not a final order where plaintiff was
later given leave to file an amended petition); Merchants Delivery Serv. v. Joe Esco Tire Co., 497
P.2d 766, 767 (Okla. 1972) (holding that an order of dismissal is not a final order if the plaintiffs
are still free to amend their petition); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2012(G) (1991) (trial court is re-
quired to grant leave to amend if defect in petition can be remedied).
72. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, ch. 15, app. 2, R. 1.60 (1991) (listing interlocutory orders that
are appealable by right).
73. See Shawnee Hosp. Auth. v. Dow Constr., Inc., 812 P.2d 1351, 1352 n.7 (Okla. 1990)
("The denial of a motion to compel arbitration is an appealable interlocutory ('midstream') or-
der."); Long v. DeGeer, 753 P.2d 1327, 1328 n.1 (Okla. 1987) (holding that a denial of motion to
compel arbitration is an appealable interlocutory order).
74. In re Estate of Johnson, 780 P.2d 692, 694 (Okla. 1989) ("The various orders for which
§ 721 provides appellate review are in the nature of interlocutory orders made in the course of
the administration of an estate.").
75. See Shriver v. Dolph, 580 P.2d 144, 146 (Okla. 1978) (holding an order granting a new
trial is an appealable interlocutory order).
76. Chemco Prods., Inc. v. Moley Produce Co., Inc., 615 P.2d 300, 301 (Okla. 1980) ("An
order which vacates a judgment is analogous to, or the functional equivalent of, one that grants a
new trial. It is hence reviewable by right.").
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modify or refuse to vacate or modify attachments or other provisional
remedies that affect substantial rights of parties; orders granting, re-
fusing, vacating, modifying, or refusing to vacate or modify temporary
injunctions;77 orders appointing receivers, or refusing to appoint, or
vacating or refusing to vacate the appointment of receivers;7 orders
directing the payment of money pendente lite,7 9 or refusing to direct,
or vacating or refusing to vacate orders directing the payment of
money pendente lite, orders certifying or refusing to certify class ac-
tions, and any other order that the trial court certifies for an immedi-
ate appeal.80
Most appealable interlocutory orders may be reviewed on appeal
from the judgment at the conclusion of the case as well as before the
judgment. Section 952(b) of title 12 provides for appellate review after
judgment of appealable interlocutory orders listed in its subdivisions 2
and 3.81 These include nearly all of the appealable interlocutory or-
ders with the exception of orders certifying or refusing to certify class
actions,82 and appealable interlocutory orders in connection with arbi-
tration proceedings8 3 and probate casess4 that do not involve injunc-
tive relief or provisional remedies affecting the substantial rights of
parties. As a consequence, appellate review for most interlocutory or-
ders will only be postponed, rather than lost entirely, on account of a
failure to file a petition in error within 30 days after the filing of the
order.85
77. See Board of Regents v. NCAA, 561 P.2d 499, 501-02 (Okla. 1977) (reviewing appeal
from grant of temporary injunction).
78. Panama Timber Co. v. Barsanti, 619 P.2d 872, 873 (Okla. 1980) ("[A]n appeal from the
trial court's refusal to vacate an order appointing a receiver, although an interlocutory order, is
appealable, as such an appeal is specifically authorized by the provisions of 12 O.S.1971 § 993.").
79. See Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Oklahoma Tower Assocs. Ltd. Partner-
ship, 798 P.2d 618, 619 (Okla. 1990) (reviewing interlocutory order enforcing an assignment of
rents by appeal under 12 O.S. § 993(A)(5)).
80. For a discussion of appealable interlocutory orders in Oklahoma, see Jerry R. Parkin-
son, Interlocutory Appeals in Oklahoma, 61 OKLA. B.J. 1397 (1990).
81. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 952(b) (1991).
82. See Id. § 993(6).
83. Id. § 817 (1991).
84. Id. § 721 (1991).
85. See, e.g., In re Estate of Johnson, 780 P.2d 692, 694 (Okla. 1989) (holding that an appeal
from an order refusing to admit will to probate can be filed either after the initial refusal or after
entry of the final accounting and distribution); Shriver v. Dolph, 580 P.2d 144, 146-147 (Okla.
1978) ("[T]he garnishee had the option of appealing the new trial direct or after final judg-
ment."). But see Williams v. Mulvihill, 846 P.2d 1097,1104 (Okla. 1993) (holding that a probate
court order declaring the sale of an estate asset a nullity resolved a controversy separate from
the probate's mainstream and would not be reviewable on appeal from the final accounting).
[Vol. 29:31
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The original Judgments and Appeals Act handled appealable in-
terlocutory orders differently than judgments and final orders for pur-
poses of the timing of appeals. Under former section 1004(A),86 the
time to appeal from an interlocutory order began to run at the time of
the hearing at which it was issued, if the appellant was present or rep-
resented at the hearing.' In contrast to judgments and final orders,
appealable interlocutory orders did not have to be filed with the court
clerk in order for them to be effective and their appeal time to expire.
The latest Judgments and Appeals Act eliminates the distinction
between appealable interlocutory orders and final orders for purposes
of the timing of appeals. Appealable orders, whether final or interloc-
utory, are appealable only after they have been prepared in written
form, signed by the court, and filed with the court clerk.,,
E. Appeals in Cases with Multiple Claims or Parties
The third provision from the original Judgments and Appeals Act
that the Legislature retained when it repealed the Act was section
1006, which governed cases involving multiple claims or parties. The
latest Judgments and Appeals Act renumbered this section as section
994 to move it closer to the other provisions dealing with appellate
procedure.
Under Oklahoma law prior to 1991, the disposition of one of sev-
eral claims in a case was immediately appealable if it arose out of a
separate transaction from the other claims; however, if it was interre-
lated with the other claims, it was not appealable until they were de-
cided.8 9 If a case involved multiple parties and a trial court's ruling
had the effect of letting one of the parties out of the case, then the
ruling would be final and immediately appealable.90 Applying these
principles caused confusion for attorneys and judges, because it was
sometimes difficult to decide whether a particular claim arose from a
86. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1004(A) (Supp. 1990) (repealed 1991).
87. See In re Estate of Nation, 834 P.2d 442, 443 (Okla. 1992) ("Appeals of interlocutory
orders appealable by right in a probate proceeding must be commenced within thirty days from
the date of the hearing at which the order was issued."). See also Williams, 846 P.2d at 1099 n.1
(dismissing appeal from interlocutory order as untimely because it was filed more than 30 days
after the order's rendition).
88. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, §§ 9, 18.
89. Compare Oklahomans for Life, Inc. v. State Fair of Oklahoma, 634 P.2d 704,706 (Okla.
1981) (ruling that two claims were distinct causes of action because they were based on separate
transactions or wrongs) with Eason Oil Co. v. Howard Eng'g, Inc., 755 P.2d 669, 672 (Okla.
1988) (ruling that no appeal could lie where claim and counterclaim were interrelated).
90. See Ritter v. Perma-Stone Co., 325 P.2d 442, 443 (Okla. 1958) (ruling that an order
sustaining demurrer as to one of two defendants was immediately appealable as a final order).
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transaction that was separate from the other claims in a case or was
interrelated with them.91
Section 1006 eliminated many of the difficulties previously en-
countered with the timing of appeals in cases involving multiple claims
or parties by adopting a simple rule: a decision as to only a part of a
case is not appealable until the trial court decides all the issues in the
case.92 Some flexibility is provided, though, with an exception that
authorizes the trial court, after finding that there is no reason for de-
laying the appeal until the end of the case, to expressly direct the
preparation of a judgment as to fewer than all the claims and parties.93
Where such an express direction has been made by the trial court, it
will be clear that a party seeking appellate review must file a petition
in error promptly; on the other hand, in the absence of such an ex-
press direction, it will be clear that the appeal should not be filed until
the judgment determining all the issues in the case is filed with the
court clerk.
Section 1006 (now section 994) authorizes the trial court to order
an immediate appeal only where the trial court lets one of the parties
out of the case or it disposes of an entire claim. A trial court should
not order an immediate appeal from a ruling that disposes of only a
single theory of recovery against a party who remains in the case.94
As under prior law, the scope of a claim is determined by a transac-
tional approach.95 However, section 1006 (now section 994) places
91. See generally Don G. Holladay, Appellate Jurisdiction in Cases Involving Multiple
Claims, 60 OKLA. BJ. 3227 (1989) (discussing prior Oklahoma law and recommending adoption
of a provision like section 1006).
92. See Dotson v. Rainbolt, 835 P.2d 870 (Okla. 1992) (ruling that an order dismissing two
defendants and granting summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants on all but one
of the claims against them was not final and appealable); DeLuca v. Mountain States Financial
Resources Corp., 827 P.2d 171 (Okla. 1992) (holding that the dismissal of a counterclaim was not
a final appealable order when the main claims remained to be litigated); Mayabb v. Price by
Price, 836 P.2d 117 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (refusing review of the dismissal of claims against a
vehicle's owner while the claims against the vehicle's driver remained pending).
93. See Eskridge v. Nalls, 852 P.2d 818, 819 n.1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1993) (hearing an appeal
from the adjudication of fewer than all claims where the trial court made an express finding that
there was no reason for delay of the appeal); Hart v. Board of County Commissioners, 842 P.2d
777, 778 n.1 (Okla. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing an appeal after the trial court entered an order
directing entry of final judgment). See also Tuttle & Assocs. v. Scoufos, 854 P.2d 388, 390 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1993) ("While the § 1006 finding and direction may be in a separate order, the better
practice seems to be to include it in the journal entry of judgment.").
94. See Spiegel v. Trustees of Thfts College, 843 F.2d 38 (1st Cir. 1988) (holding that counts
which were dismissed were intertwined with counts which were not dismissed, and so immediate
judgment should not have been entered under FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b)).
95. See generally Retherford v. Halliburton Co., 572 P.2d 966, 968-69 (Okla. 1978) (discuss-
ing scope of cause of action).
[Vol. 29:31
18
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 29 [1993], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol29/iss1/2
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
the responsibility for deciding whether a ruling disposes of an entire
claim on the trial judge, rather than on the appealing party.
Despite the fact that section 1006 (now section 994) does not con-
tain any exceptions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has ruled that sec-
tion 1006 did not apply in particular types of proceedings. 6 In neither
of the cases where the Court disregarded the plain language of the
statute did it give any reasons to support its conclusion. The Court's
creation of exceptions is hard to justify and because the Court did not
express its reasoning it is difficult to predict what other exceptions the
Court will read into section 994 in the future.
F. Effect of Post-Trial Motions on Appeal Time
The time for commencing an appeal is extended under Section
990.2(A) by the filing of various post-trial motions within ten days
after the filing of the judgment.97 Until the post-trial motions are re-
solved, there is the possibility that the appeal may become moot by
the trial court's alteration of the judgment. This possibility is recog-
nized in section 991 of title 12, which provides that if a motion for new
trial is filed, an appeal should not be taken until after the trial court
has ruled on the motion.98 Section 991 is limited to motions for new
trial, but other motions, such as motions to vacate a judgment, can
give the trial court an opportunity to alter a judgment and moot an
appeal. Section 991 does not permit the filing of motions to vacate a
judgment to extend the time for appeal, because some of these mo-
tions may be filed years after a judgment and the time to appeal might
therefore be prolonged for an inordinate period.
Problems in applying section 991 have arisen, because it is often
difficult to distinguish a motion for new trial from a motion to vacate a
judgment, since the relief sought by these motions can be overlapping.
Section 651 of title 12 lists nine grounds for new trial,99 but there are
no restrictions on a trial court's power to vacate a judgment under
section 1031.1 of title 12.100 Moreover, the first of the grounds given
in section 1031 for vacating a judgment incorporates the grounds for
96. Wflliams, 846 P.2d at 1104 n.27 ("The terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 1006 are not applicable to
probate proceedings."); Central Plastics Co. v. Barton Indus., Inc., 818 P.2d 900, 900 (Okla.
1991) ("The court finds that 12 O.S. 1991 § 1006 does not apply to postjudgment proceedings.").
97. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 19.
98. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 991 (1991).
99. OLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 651 (1991).
100. See Schepp v. Hess, 770 P.2d 34, 38 (Okla. 1989) ("Neither the terms of § 1031.1 nor
those of its common-law antecedents restrict the exercise of tenn-time power to any specific
grounds.") (emphasis in original).
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granting a new trial by express reference. 101 Consequently, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court has treated some motions that were la-
belled "motions to vacate" as motions for new trial for purposes of
extending the time to appeal under section 9 91 ."c A post-trial motion
labelled a "motion to reconsider" may be especially difficult to cate-
gorize as either a motion for new trial or another type of motion for
purposes of section 991. The Oklahoma Supreme Court alluded to this
difficulty in Salyer v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc.:
°103
[The so-called "motion to reconsider"] causes great confusion. If
timely filed, a motion to reconsider may be regarded as one for new
trial under 12 O.S. 1981 § 651 and hence effective to extend appeal
time for review of a final order or judgment, Horizons, Inc. v. KEO
Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 758 (Okla. 1984); or it may be treated as
one to modify or to vacate a final order or judgment under 12 O.S.
§§ 1031 and 1031.1. If the motion is deemed to fall into the latter
class, it will not extend the time to seek review of the final order or
judgment to which it is directed.) (emphasis in original).
Section 990.2(A) 1°4 does not attempt to distinguish between mo-
tions for new trial and motions to vacate a judgment; instead, it pro-
vides for a ten day bright line rule. If a motion for new trial, a motion
for a judgment n.o.v., or a motion to vacate a judgment (whether de-
nominated as a motion to reconsider, alter, vacate, or amend a judg-
ment) is filed not later than ten days after the filing of the judgment,
then it will extend the time for appeal until the trial court's ruling on
the motion.10 5
An exception to the rule extending the time for appeal is made
for motions to amend a judgment, decree, or final order to include the
award of costs, attorney's fees, or interest that are ancillary to the
judgment. A motion seeking any of these items will not extend the
101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1031 (1991) provides in pertinent part:
The district court shall have power to vacate or modify its own judgments or orders
within the times prescribed hereafter: First. By granting a new trial for the cause,
within the time and in the manner prescribed in Section 653 of this title.
102. Hall v. Edge, 782 P.2d 122,124 (Okla. 1989) ("A motion seeking vacation of a judgment
which is filed within 10 days of the decision may be regarded as the functional equivalent of a
motion for new trial."); Horizons, Inc. v. KEO Leasing Co., 681 P.2d 757, 759 (Okla. 1984)
("Plaintiff's 'motion to vacate', filed below within 10 days of the judgment date, was properly
treated as one for new trial.").
103. 727 P.2d 1361, 1362 n.1 (Okla. 1986). See also Pierson v. Canupp, 754 P.2d 548, 550 n.1
(Okla. 1988) (similar language).
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time for appeal.1 °6 Section 696.4(A) 10 7 provides that these items do
not need to be included in a judgment, decree, or appealable order
and that the preparation and filing of a judgment, decree, or appeala-
ble order is not to be delayed for their determination. 08 These items
will have to be determined soon after a judgment, though, since sec-
tion Section 696.4(B) requires an application for any of these items to
be filed within 30 days after the filing of the judgment, decree, or ap-
pealable order.
The other side of the bright line rule is that a motion filed more
than ten days after the filing of the judgment, decree, or final order
will not extend the time for appeal. A motion for new trial or judg-
ment n.o.v. filed more than ten days after the filing of a judgment,
decree, or final order should be summarily denied as untimely. A mo-
tion to vacate filed more than ten days after the filing of a judgment
may be timely and eventually it may result in the alteration of the
judgment, but section 990.2(B) 10 9 makes clear that the motion will not
extend the time for appeal. Instead, the appeal will go forward, while
the trial court is ruling on the motion, and the parties have the obliga-
tion to inform the Oklahoma Supreme Court of the trial court's dispo-
sition of the motion.
G. Savings Provisions for Premature Appeals
The use of the date of filing as the beginning of the 30-day period
for commencing an appeal creates a possibility that premature appeals
may be filed." 0 Premature appeals may also arise on account of the
extension of the time for appeal resulting from the filing of post-trial
motions. For example, appeals were dismissed as premature in Tim-
mons Oil Co., Inc. v. Norman,"' and Delhi Gas Pipeline Corp. v.
Mayhall,112 when a petition in error was filed before the filing of a
106. See generally Percival, supra note 11, at 154 (recommending amendment to Rule for
Appellate Procedures in Civil Cases so "as to leave no question as to when a petition in error
must be filed where the trial court has decided all issues except attorney fees.").
107. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 11.
108. In Fleet v. Sanguine, Ltd., 854 P.2d 892, 899 & n.37 (Okla. 1993), the Oklahoma
Supreme Court ruled that prejudgment interest differed from costs because it was a part of thejudgment, while costs are merely ancillary to the judgment. The newly-added section 696.4 of
title 12 supersedes the Fleet case.
109. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 19.
110. See P & H Oil Field Serv., Inc. 823 P.2d at 365 (holding that appeal was premature
because the petition in error was filed prior to the filing of the order overruling a motion for new
trial).
111. 794 P.2d 400 (Okla. 1990).
112. 546 P.2d 1019 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976).
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motion for new trial, and a subsequent petition in error was not filed
after the trial court denied the new trial motion. The Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals ruled in each case that the petition in error
was ineffective because it was filed before the trial court's ruling on
the new trial motion, and since no petition in error was filed within 30
days after the trial court's ruling, there was no appellate jurisdiction.
The savings provisions in section 990A(F)1 3 attempt to alleviate
the problem of premature appeals by giving an appellant 30 days after
being sent notice of the dismissal of an appeal as premature in which
to file a new petition in error. Section 990A(F) also provides that an
appellant may salvage a premature appeal before it is dismissed by
filing a supplemental petition in error after the trial court rules on the
post-trial motion. Allowing an appellant to file a new or supplemental
petition in error so that a premature appeal can go forward causes no
prejudice to an appellee, since even a prematurely filed petition in
error gives adequate notice that an appeal is being sought.
H. Effect of Judgments and Appeals Act on Pending Cases
The original Judgments and Appeals Act had a transition provi-
sion stating that it "shall govern all judgments and appealable orders
rendered on or after" its effective date." 4 The latest Judgments and
Appeals Act has no such provision. Nevertheless, the latest Judg-
ments and Appeals Act ought to be applied to litigation pending on its
effective date, because procedural changes are generally given imme-
diate effect." 5 In Patmon v. Block,116 a recent case that involved a
question as to which law of appellate procedure applied, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court ruled as follows: "A litigant's right of ap-
peal is governed by the law in effect when the appealable event takes
place."117
Several of the issues that the Oklahoma Legislature resolved by
adopting the latest Judgments and Appeals Act were also problems in
113. 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 18.
114. 1990 Okla. Sess. Laws 910, 922; In re Estate of Dalzell, 813 P.2d 537 (Okla. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that the original Judgments and Appeals Act did not apply to a judgment ren-
dered before its effective date).
115. See NORMAN J. SINGER, 2 SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 41.09 (4th ed.
1986) ("Unless a contrary legislative intent appears, changes in statute law which pertain only to
procedure are generally held to apply to pending cases.").
116. 851 P.2d 539 (Okla. 1993).
117. Id. at 542. (emphasis in original).
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the federal court system that are now being resolved by the amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. While the Judg-
ments and Appeals Act and the amendments to the Federal Rules
deal with a number of the same problems, the approaches taken to
resolve them differ in interesting ways. The amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules are discussed below and compared to the revisions to
Oklahoma appellate procedure made by the Judgments and Appeals
Act.
IV. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
A. Effect of Post-Trial Motions on Appeal Time
The time allowed in federal courts for filing a notice of appeal is
30 days from the entry of judgment,' but this time is extended by the
filing of various post-trial motions that are listed in Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4). Not all post-trial motions extend the time to appeal, however,
and before the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, it was not always clear which post-trial motions extended
the time to appeal and which did not. By providing that motions for
relief from judgment that are filed within ten days of the entry of judg-
ment extend the time for appeal, the 1993 amendments have clarified
the timing of appeals in federal court.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize the filing of vari-
ous post-trial motions (including motions for new trial,119 motions for
judgment as a matter of law,' 2 ' and motions for relief from judg-
ment121) at different times following entry of a judgment. The original
version of the Federal Rules that was adopted in 1938 did not address
whether the pendency of a post-trial motion would affect the time for
filing a notice of appeal.'22 It was soon recognized in the federal
cases, however, that the filing of some post-trial motions ought to sus-
pend a judgment's finality because of the possibility that they would
have a substantial effect on the underlying judgment.2 3
118. Except as otherwise provided in this section, no appeal shall bring any judgment,
order or decree in an action, suit or proceeding of a civil nature before a court of
appeals for review unless notice of appeal is filed, within thirty days after the entry of
such judgment, order or decree.
28 U.S.C. § 2107(A) (1988). see also FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
119. See FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50.
121. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
122. See FED. R. Crv. P. 73(a); 28 U.S.C. app. p. 2651 (1940).
123. See Leishman v. Associated wholesale Electric Co., 318 U.S. 203, 205 (1943) (filing of
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In 1948, Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a), the predecessor to today's Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a), was amended to provide that the time to appeal was
extended by the filing of the following categories of post-trial motions:
motions for judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b), motions to amend
or make additional findings of fact under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(b), mo-
tions to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, and mo-
tions for new trial under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59.124
Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a) was incorporated into Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)
without substantial change when the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure were adopted in 1968. Although a number of amendments to
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were made in 1979, the list
of post-trial motions in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) that extended the time for
appeal was not altered until 1993.
Post-trial motions come in many varieties, and determining which
post-trial motions fit into the categories listed in Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4) has occupied a number of federal appellate courts. One issue
that has arisen is whether motions directed at items of ancillary relief,
such as costs, attorney fees, or interest, were motions to alter or
amend a judgment which under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 would extend the
time to appeal. In a line of cases, the United States Supreme Court
has ruled that a motion seeking ancillary relief is not a motion to alter
or amend a judgment for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 if it is collat-
eral to the judgment on the main claim,125 but that it would constitute
a judgment if directed at a part of the judgment on the merits. 126
The U.S. Supreme Court first distinguished a motion for ancillary
relief from a motion to alter or amend a judgment in White v. New
Hampshire Department of Employment Security."7 Over four months
after the entry of judgment pursuant to a consent decree, the plaintiff
filed a motion for the award of attorney fees under the Civil Rights
motion to amend findings of fact "deprived the judgment of that finality which is essential to
appealability"); Gulf Ref. Co. v. Mark C. Walker & Son Co., 124 F.2d 420, 423 (6th Cir. 1942)
(ruling that motion for new trial extended time for appeal), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 683 (1942);
Reliance Life Ins. Co. v. Burgess, 112 F.2d 234, 240 (8th Cir. 1940) (holding that a motion for
judgment n.o.v. extended time for appeal); Neely v. Merchants Trust Co., 110 F.2d 525,525 (3d
Cir. 1940) (ruling that a motion to amend a judgment extended time for appeal).
124. FED. R. Cv. P. 73(a); 28 U.S.C. app. p. 6157 (1964).
125. See Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 268-69 (1988) (holding that a motion for
costs did not extend time to appeal); White v. New Hampshire Dept. of Employment Security,
455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982) (ruling that a motion for award of attorney fees as costs was not a
motion to alter or amend a judgment).
126. See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169,175-76 (1989) (ruling that a motion for
an award of discretionary prejudgment interest was a motion to alter or amend the judgment).
127. 455 U.S. 445 (1982).
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Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. The trial court awarded the at-
torney fees, but the Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that the
motion was untimely, having been filed outside of the ten day time
limit set in Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The Supreme Court reversed, hold-
ing that Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) did not apply to an award of attorney
fees under the civil rights statute, because the trial court's decision
regarding the attorney fees was separate from its decision on the mer-
its.'28 In explaining its holding the Supreme Court quoted the follow-
ing language from a Fifth Circuit decision:129 "[A] motion for
attorney's fees is unlike a motion to alter or amend a judgment. It
does not imply a change in the judgment, but merely seeks what is due
because of the judgment.' 130
The next case to reach the Supreme Court involving the charac-
terization of a post-trial motion was Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc. 31
Buchanan was concerned with whether an application for allowance
of costs extended the time for filing a notice of appeal under Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a)(4). One day after the entry of judgment of dismissal, the
plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. Two days later, the defendants filed
their application for costs, which they styled as a "Motion to Alter or
Amend Judgment." The plaintiffs did not file a second notice of ap-
peal and as a result, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the
ground that the motion for costs was a motion to alter or amend a
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), which rendered the first notice
of appeal void under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). Following its decision in
White, the Supreme Court held that "a request for costs raises issues
wholly collateral to the judgment in the main cause of action, issues to
which Rule 59(e) was not intended to apply.' 32 The Court also deter-
mined that the style of the motion was not determinative of how it
should be categorized for purposes of the timing of appeal. Despite
the motion's label, the Supreme Court concluded that it was a motion
for costs rather than a motion to alter or amend a judgment. Conse-
quently, the notice of appeal was effective, and the Supreme Court
reversed the dismissal of the appeal.
Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co.' 33 was concerned with
whether a decision on the merits was appealable while a motion for
128. Id. at 451-452.
129. Knighton v. Watkins, 616 F.2d 795, 797 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. White, 455 U.S. at 452.
131. 485 U.S. 265 (1988).
132. Id. at 268-69.
133. 486 U.S. 196 (1988).
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attorney fees remained pending before the trial court. After being
awarded a verdict for a substantially smaller amount than he had
sought in a diversity of citizenship case, the plaintiff moved for new
trial and also filed a motion for attorney fees. The trial court denied
the motion for new trial, ruled that the plaintiff was entitled to attor-
ney fees under state law, and requested further briefing and documen-
tation before awarding the fees. The plaintiff did not file his notice of
appeal until after the trial court issued its final order with respect to
the fees several months after the denial of the new trial motion. The
Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as to all issues other than the
award of attorney fees on the ground that the plaintiff needed to have
filed a notice of appeal within 30 days after the denial of the motion
for new trial in order for the decision on the merits to be reviewed.
Once again relying on White, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that a motion for attorney fees was collateral to and separate from the
decision on the merits, even if the award of attorney fees were based
on state law.'3
The Supreme Court distinguished White, Buchanan, and Budinich
in Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 35 where it held that a motion for
discretionary prejudgment interest extended the time for appeal be-
cause it was a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59(e). After the entry of judgment on a verdict, the plaintiffs
filed a motion for prejudgment interest, and while their motion was
pending, they filed a notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals dis-
missed the appeal on the ground that the notice of appeal was ineffec-
tive because it was filed before the disposition of the plaintiffs' motion
for prejudgment interest. In affirming, the United States Supreme
Court ruled that prejudgment interest was an element of the plaintiffs'
complete compensation and therefore, it differed from attorney fees,
which were traditionally treated as a part of costs that were separate
from the merits of the case. Accordingly, a motion for prejudgment
interest involved a reconsideration of the merits of the judgment and
thus was a motion to alter or amend a judgment that extended the
time for appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4). 3 6
The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules make only a minor
modification to this line of cases. Under the 1993 amendment to Fed.
134. Id. at 200-202.
135. 489 U.S. 169 (1989).
136. Id. at 176 ("[W]e conclude that a postjudgment motion for discretionary prejudgment
interest involves the kind of reconsideration of matters encompassed within the merits of a judg-
ment to which Rule 59(e) was intended to apply.").
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R. Civ. P. 58, the trial court is authorized to order that a timely mo-
tion for attorney fees filed before a notice of appeal is filed will have
the same effect on the timing of the appeal as a motion for new
trial.137 The Advisory Committee Notes to this amendment state that
extending the time to appeal until after the determination of the mo-
tion for attorney fees may promote efficiency in some cases by permit-
ting an appeal from the fee award to be taken up at the same time as
the appeal from the merits. 38 In the absence of an order from the
trial court, the Budinich decision will continue to be controlling au-
thority so that a motion for attorney fees would not extend the time to
appeal.
The other difficulty with categorizing motions for purposes of
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) arises because of the overlapping grounds for
motions for new trial or to alter or amend a judgment under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 59 and motions for relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60. One distinction between a Rule 59 motion and a Rule 60 motion
for relief from judgment is that a Rule 59 motion must be filed within
ten days of the entry of judgment, while a motion for relief from judg-
ment may be filed later.139 However, a motion for relief from judg-
ment filed within ten days of the entry of judgment is often
indistinguishable from a motion for new trial and so a number of ap-
pellate courts have treated all motions filed within ten days of the
entry of judgment that are directed to the correctness of the judgment
as Rule 59 motions. 14° The 1993 amendments adopted this approach
by adding a "motion for relief under Rule 60 if the motion is served
within 10 days after the entry of judgment" to the list of motions in
137. AMENDmmrrs To r=m FEDERAL RuLEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 146 F.R.D. 401, 480
(1993) (hereafter FRCP AmErDmErs).
138. Id. at 705.
139. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b),(e) with FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b) (one year limitation for
some categories of motions; no time limit for other categories).
140. See, e.g., Skagerberg v. Oklahoma, 797 F.2d 881, 883 (10th Cir. 1986) ("[R]egardless of
how it is characterized, a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment
that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend
judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e)."); Harcon Barge Co., Inc. v. D & G Boat Rentals, Inc., 784
F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1986) (en bane) ("[W]e hold that any post-judgment motion to alter or
amend the judgment served within ten days after the entry of the judgment, other than a motion
to correct purely clerical errors covered by Rule 60(a), is within the unrestricted scope of Rule
59(e) and must, however designated by the movant, be considered as a Rule 59(e) motion for
purposes of Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(4)."), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 930 (1986). See also Griggs v. Provi-
dent Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 68 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[Miotions cap-
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Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) that extend the time for appeal. 141
As a result of the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Ap-
pellate Procedure and the adoption of the latest Judgments and Ap-
peals Act in Oklahoma, the provisions governing the effect of post-
trial motions on the timing of appeals are fairly similar in the two
court systems. Both systems have a ten day bright line rule separating
motions that extend the time for appeal from those that do not.142 In
addition, a motion involving costs will not extend the time for appeal
in either the federal143 or Oklahoma state courts.'" There are differ-
ences between the two court systems, however, with respect to the
effect of motions for attorney's fees and for interest on appeal time.
In Oklahoma, a motion for either attorney's fees or interest will not
affect the time for appeal. 45 In the federal courts, a motion for attor-
ney fees will not affect the time for appeal146 unless the trial court
orders otherwise pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 58,147 but a motion for
interest is treated as a motion to alter or amend a judgment for pur-
poses of appeal time. 148
B. The Elimination of Adverse Consequences From Premature
Appeals
The 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure have also removed the severe penalty that Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(4) has exacted for premature appeals since it was added in 1979.
By allowing various post-trial appeals to extend the time to appeal,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) opens up the possibility of premature appeals
being filed before disposition of the post-trial motions. The 1948 ver-
sion of the Federal Rules149 did not indicate whether a prematurely
filed notice of appeal would be effective, but most cases that were
decided under it gave effect to a prematurely filed notice of appeal,
unless the prematurity of the notice of appeal had caused prejudice to
141. AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLE-s oF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, 147 F.R.D. 287,
297, 363 (1993) (hereafter FRAP AENDMEN-s).
142. See id. See also 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 19.
143. See Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265, 269 (1988).
144. See 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 19(A).
145. See 1993 Okla. Sess. Laws c. 351, § 19(A).
146. See Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202.
147. FRAP AMENDMENTS, supra note 142 at 297 and 363-64; FRCP AMENDMENTs supra
note 138 at 480.
148. See Osterneck 489 U.S. at 176.
149. FED. R. Civ. P. 73(a); 28 U.S.C. app. p. 6157 (1964).
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the appellee.150 The 1979 amendments to Fed. R. App. P. 4(a) super-
seded the prior case law by stating that "[a] notice filed before the
disposition of any of the [post-trial motions extending the time for
appeal] shall have no effect.' 15 1 Unfortunately, an appellant who files
a premature appeal may not learn of the mistake until it is too late to
file a timely notice of appeal.
In Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co.,' 52 the United
States Supreme Court held that the 1979 amendments to Fed. R.
App. P. 4(a) resulted in the appellate courts' losing jurisdiction over
prematurely filed appeals. Griggs arose out of the refinancing of a
consumer loan. The plaintiffs sued the lender seeking damages for
violations of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board, and the lender counterclaimed for setoff of the
loan it had made to the plaintiffs. The trial court granted the plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment and awarded statutory damages
of $1,000 under the Truth in Lending Act to each plaintiff. After the
trial court directed the entry of a final judgment with respect to the
plaintiffs' claim, the lender filed a motion to alter or amend the judg-
ment, and while its motion was pending, also filed a notice of appeal.
Four days after the filing of the notice of appeal, the trial court denied
the lender's motion to alter or amend the judgment. The Third Cir-
cuit allowed the appeal to proceed despite the prematurity of the no-
tice of appeal, but the U.S. Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme
Court held that the filing of the post-trial motion caused the appellate
court to lose jurisdiction over the appeal, because the premature no-
tice of appeal "was not merely defective, it was a nullity" so that it was
"as if no notice of appeal were filed at all.' 53
Many appeals have been dismissed over the years on account of
the procedural trap in Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), 54 particularly those
150. See e.g., Williams v. Town of Okoboji, 599 F.2d 238,239 (8th Cir. 1979) ("Although such
premature appeals are subject to dismissal.... generally the appellant may proceed unless the
appellee can show show prejudice resulting from the prematurity of the notice."), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 925 (1981); Stokes v. Peyton's Inc., 508 F.2d 1287, 1288 (5th Cir. 1975) (denying motion
to dismiss appeal in absence of prejudice to appellee on account of prematurity of notice of
appeal). But see Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir. 1979)
("A notice of appeal filed while.., a [post-trial] motion is still pending in the trial court is
prematurely filed and does not transfer jurisdiction to the court of appeals."), cert dismissed, 444
U.S. 987 (1979).
151. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4), 28 U.S.C. app. p. 515 (1988).
152. 459 U.S. 56 (1982).
153. Id. at 61.
154. One indication of the problems that litigants have had with FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) is
the large number of appellate decisions that have dealt with it. Over 1,000 cases are generated by
Westlaw in response to the keyword "4(a)(4)."
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filed by pro se appellants. 155 To eliminate this trap, the 1993 amend-
ments have made the prematurely filed notice of appeal automatically
effective once the trial court rules on the post-trial motion.5 6 The
appellate court needs to be informed of the district court's ruling in
order to know when the appeal is effective, and so Fed. R. App. P.
3(d) was also amended to require the clerk of the district court to mail
a copy of any docket entry in the case after the filing of the notice of
appeal to the Court of Appeals. 57 In some cases, the district court's
ruling on a post-trial motion may substantially modify the judgment
and cause the appeal to become moot. If this occurs, the appellant is
likely not to pursue the appeal, and it will be dismissed for failure to
meet the briefing schedule; alternatively, the appellee may move to
strike the appeal. A party may also want to appeal from a district
court's modification of a judgment, and this may be done by filing an
amended notice of appeal within 30 days after the entry of the modi-
fied judgment.
The federal solution to the problem of premature appeals is pos-
sibly more elegant than the Oklahoma solution, which requires the
appellant to file either a supplemental petition in error or a new peti-
tion in error after the trial court files its order deciding a post-trial
motion.'5 9 However, the federal solution of having a premature ap-
peal simply ripen into an effective appeal once a post-trial motion is
decided requires the clerk of the trial court to mail copies of all docket
entries subsequent to the notice of appeal to the appellate court clerk.
Because the Oklahoma state court system lacks the level of clerical
support that the federal system has, requiring Oklahoma court clerks
to mail copies of docket entries to the Oklahoma Supreme Court
probably is not feasible. In addition, it is not unreasonable to impose
the burden of notifying the Oklahoma Supreme Court of the trial
court's disposition of a post-trial motion on the appellant who was
responsible for prematurely filing the petition in error.
C. Filing of Appeals by Inmates
Another change made by the 1993 amendments to the Federal
155. See Averhart v. Arrendondo, 773 F.2d 919, 920 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(4)] is a trap for the unwary into which many appellants, especially those not represented by
counsel ... have fallen, with dire consequences since there is no way they can reinstate their
appeal if the second notice of appeal is untimely.").
156. FRAP A MN mDmrs, supra note 142, at 297, 362-63.
157. Id. at 293, 348-49.
158. Id. at 298, 354-55.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
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Rules of Appellate Procedure is to codify the result in Houston v.
Lack160 that fixes the time of filing of a pro se appeal by a prisoner as
the time of delivery to the prison authorities for forwarding to the
court clerk. 6' The Supreme Court noted in the Houston case the gen-
eral rule that the district court's receipt of the notice of appeal is re-
quired within the 30-day time to appeal, and that an appellant's
placing the notice of appeal in the mail is not sufficient.'62 The Court
pointed out that this general rule should not apply to a filing by a pro
se prisoner, however, because a prisoner loses all control over a notice
of appeal once it is delivered to the prison authorities. Besides codify-
ing the result from the Houston case, Fed. R. App. P. 4(c) also speci-
fies the timing for cross-appeals to run from the district court's receipt
of a prisoner's notice of appeal. 63 As noted previously,' 4 the
Oklahoma Supreme Court also deems a pro se prisoner's petition in
error to be filed when it is delivered to prisoner authorities.
D. Naming of Parties in the Notice of Appeal
An issue that has produced a surprising amount of litigation in
the federal courts in recent years is the identification of the parties to
an appeal in the notice of appeal. This litigation has arisen in re-
sponse to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Torres v.
Oakland Scavenger Co.' 65 that the use of the phrase "et al." in a notice
of appeal was not sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction over a
party who was not otherwise identified in the notice of appeal.
The Torres case arose out of an employment discrimination case
in which Jose Torres was one of 16 plaintiffs seeking to intervene. The
trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, but the
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. On
remand, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for partial
summary judgment as to Jose Torres, because his name did not appear
in either the notice of appeal or the order of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, holding that the require-
ment in Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) that a notice of appeal "shall specify the
party or parties taking the appeal" was jurisdictional, and that a fail-
ure to identify a party in an appeal constituted a failure of that party
160. 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988).
161. See FRAP AMENDMENTs, supra note 142, at 301-02, 366.
162. Houston, 487 U.S. at 274.
163. See FRAP AmENDmENrs, supra note 142, at 302, 366.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
165. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
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to appeal.166 The Court also decided that the use of the phrase "et al."
in the notice of appeal did not satisfy the specificity requirement in
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c), because it did not give fair notice of the specific
individual who was seeking to appeal.
The Torres rule created a trap for unwary appellants because it
differs from Fed. R. Civ. P. 10, which provides that for all pleadings
filed in the district court other than the complaint "it is sufficient to
state the name of the first party on each side with an appropriate indi-
cation of other parties." In order to prevent appellants from inadver-
tently losing their right to appeal, the Advisory Committee decided to
amend Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) by authorizing the notice of appeal to
indicate generally which parties are appealing without naming them
individually. 67 To avoid uncertainty as to the identities of the appel-
lants, an attorney filing a notice of appeal is required to file a repre-
sentation statement that names each party whom the attorney
represents on the appeal.1 68 In contrast to the notice of appeal, the
representation statement is not jurisdictional and therefore may be
amended during the course of the appeal. 69
The Oklahoma Judgments and Appeals Act does not address
whether the appellants must be specified individually in the petition in
error. Generally, a petition in error may not be amended to add an-
other appellant after the expiration of the time to appeal.17 0 How-
ever, the Oklahoma Supreme Court allowed such an amendment in
Bane v. Anderson, Bryant & Co., 7' where the additional appellant
was represented by the attorney who represented an appellant who
was listed in the petition in error, the attorney submitted an affidavit
that all papers he filed in the appeal were on behalf of both appel-
lants, and an order of the trial court included a reference to an appeal
filed by both appellants. Because the holding in the Bane case will
probably be limited to its particular circumstances, attorneys should
be careful to name each appellant in the petition in error and not rely
166. Id. at 314-15.
167. See FRAP AmENDtmrrs, supra note 142, at 291, 332-35, 347.
168. See AMENDMENTS TO TE FEDERAL RuLEs OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE, FED. R. APP.
P. 12(b), 147 F.R.D. 287, 307-08, 374-75 (1993).
169. Id. at 375.
170. Ogle v. Ogle, 517 P.2d 797, 799 (Okla. 1973) ("[Rule 1.17(a)] does not contemplate
amendment to substitute appellants."); Davis v. Howard, 803 P.2d 1172, 1174 (Okla. Ct. App.
1990) (quoting Ogle).
171. 786 P.2d 1230 (Okla. 1989).
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on the general phrase "et al." to confer appellate jurisdiction over per-




The 30-day deadline for appealing a judgment appears straight-
forward enough, but a number of uncertainties have perplexed appel-
lants in both the federal and Oklahoma appellate systems. In the
Oklahoma state courts, the time of rendition of a judgment was fre-
quently ambiguous, it was not always clear whether a particular post-
trial motion extended the time for appeal, and an appeal could be
dismissed because the appellant inadvertently filed the petition in er-
ror prematurely. Federal appellate procedure was somewhat less un-
certain, because the date of a judgment's effectiveness was based on
its date of entry in the judgment docket, rather than on its pronounce-
ment by a judge. Nevertheless, federal appellate procedure had
problems similar to those of Oklahoma appellate procedure with re-
spect to determining which post-trial motions extended the time to
appeal and the dismissal of premature appeals. By a remarkable coin-
cidence, both Oklahoma and federal appellate procedures are being
revised to correct problems that they had in common, albeit in some-
what different ways. It remains to be seen whether the revisions will
be effective or will generate additional problems that the drafters did
not envision.
172. J. Michael Medina, Avoiding Procedural Traps in the Appellate Process: The Proper
Care and Feeding of a Petition in Error, 64 OKLA. BI. 933, 934 (1993). Cf. Vickers v. Boyd, 836
P.2d 1269, 1270-71 (Okla. 1992) (ruling that misdesignation of appellants in caption was not fatal
where correct appellant was identified in the text of the petition in error).
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